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Introduction 
Graham Allison, a well-:known American political scientist, once 
asked whether public and private management were 'fundamentally 
alike in all unimportant respects' (Allison, 1994). Do government 
and business truly inhabit different worlds? Several scholars of 
public management, particularly those with a political science 
background, would say yes. Government, they believe, is 
fundamentally different from business because it operates in a 
political milieu and its objectives have little to do with profit 
maximisation. One cannot therefore expect public organisations 
to function like private firms. 
Scholars and practitioners of management may see things 
differently. They might point out that, however distinct 
government might be, efforts to improve its performance are 
ongoing, just as they are in private firms; and that in both public 
and private sectors those efforts draw on a common toolkit of 
management techniques. From this perspective the differences 
rather than the similarities between public and private sectors look 
superficial. 
The debate goes on (e.g.: Hughes, 1998; Farnham & Horton, 
1999). Indeed, it has been given new life by the so-called 'new 
public management' movement, which is often characterised as 
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an attempt to bring private-sector management styles and 
techniques into government (Minogue, 1998). The debate is often 
bound up with a competition of disciplines between scholars of 
government, whose interest is to claim exclusivity, and scholars of 
management, whose interest is to deny it. 
This chapter takes recruitment and selection in the public service 
of Malta as a case study of the differences between public and private 
sector management. It asks whether staffing in the public service 
has distinctive features, and whether these in turn stem from factors 
specific to government. It also asks whether these features are 
immutable and unchanging or whether they can be acted upon 
and their effect mitigated. An organisation is influenced by its 
operating environment; but, can it also exert an influence on its 
environment? 
The most striking thing about recruitment and selection in the 
Maltese public service is the extent to which external actors are 
directly involved in the process. Leaving aside the topmost 
positions, where selection is at the Prime Minister's discretion, it 
is by and large true to say that public servants select staff to fill 
public service vacancies; but the parameters within which they do 
so and the procedures that they follow are to a remarkable extent 
influenced, not to say determined, by external actors. This marks 
the public service out by comparison with private firms, although 
as we will see it is less an absolute difference than one of degree. 
Yet, one is also struck by the extent of the changes that have 
taken place in the field of public service staffing over the last decade. 
Following the publication in 1989 of a report on the reform of the 
public service (PSRC, 1989), a wide-ranging programme of reform 
was instituted. This has brought about major changes in the human 
resource management framework of the service, as we shall see 
later. The service has shown itself amply capable of adaptation and 
modernisation. It remains distinctive by comparison with the 
private sector, but the differences are not immutable. 
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What the public service is, and how it is organised 
The public service consists essentially of the employees of 
government ministries and departments, as well as those of a few 
autonomous bodies such as the Public Service Commission and 
the Electoral Office. The public service should not be confused with 
the broader public sector. The latter includes a variety of bodies, 
statutory public authorities and corporations, government-
controlled companies and foundations, local councils, the 
University of Malta and the Armed Forces, which are not part of 
the public service and whose staff are not public service employees 
(unless they happen to be on secondment from government 
departments). The public service has around 31,000 employees, 
or 22 % of the labour force, whereas the public sector as a whole 
numbers some 49,000 (or 35 %). More information on staffing 
levels can be found in Table 1. 
Table 1: Public Sector Employment 1997-2001 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Government ministries 
and departments 30,188 30,529 30,498 30,488 30,839 
Armed Forces, 
Revenue Security Corps 
and Airport Company 1,900 1,622 1,599 1,654 1,612 
Independent staturory 
bodies 10,304 8,223 8,141 8,146 8,216 
Companies with public 
sector majority shareholding 7,871 9,356 7,184 7,704 7,974 
Total public sector 
employment 50,263 49,730 47,422 47,992 48,641 
Source: National Statistics Office 
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The terms 'public service' and 'civil service' are synonymous in 
Malta, although the former is the correct one at law. Public servants 
are formally known as public officers, a term indicating that they 
are employed directly by the government-that is, not by public 
corporations or other public sector entities-in a civilian capacity. 
Most ministries tend to be relatively small organisations oriented 
towards policy-making and the monitoring of implementation. 
In addition to the minister and his or her political staff, each 
ministry has a permanent structure consisting of career public 
officers who report to a permanent secretary. The latter is the most 
senior career officer in the ministry and has the dual role of 
managing the ministry itself and overseeing the work of 
departments. 
Most of the executive work of the public service is undertaken 
by departments, which can vary in size from a handful of staff to a 
few thousand. Departments have traditionally been regarded as 
organisationally separate from ministries. However, they are 
integrated within a chain of command linking each head of 
department to his or her minister through the respective permanent 
secretary. Large departments such as Agriculture, Education or 
Health, which are headed by directors general, have come to be 
known as 'divisions' to distinguish them from smaller departments 
or directorates headed by directors. 
Figure 1 portrays for illustrative purposes the organisational 
structure of the Office of the Prime Minister. 
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F igltre 1: Simplified organisation chart of the Office of the Prime Minister as at April 
2003 
Cabinet Secretariat Prime Minister Private Secretariat 
I 
Director, Corporate 
-
Permanent 
r--
Director, Strategy 
Services Secretary and Planning 
I I 
Director General, Director General, 
Administration Management and 
Personnel Office 
I I 
-
Director, Oil 
I-
Director, Employee 
Exploration Relations 
~ Director, Information H Director, Resourcing 
Director, Director, 
- Regional Policy I- Policy and Planning 
Director, Director, Staff 
- Government Printing '-- Development 
Press Organisation 
Some units, including statutory authorities and other non-public service entities, 
are not shown. 
Source: adapted from the organisation chart at 
http;llwll!lI!.opm.gov.mtlpicslpdfloplll_organigram.pdf 
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The role of external actors in recruitment and selection 
Staffing in the Maltese public service is governed by Chapter X of 
the 1974 Constitution. The bulk of this part of the Constitution 
is devoted to defining the role and powers of the Public Service 
Commission, an independent body which oversees appointments and 
discipline. Where staffing is concerned, the Commission's remit extends 
to virtually all of the public service other than appointments to 
headship positions, which are at the Prime Minister's discretion. 
The other major players in recruitment and selection are staff 
unions. Malta's two largest unions, the General Workers' Union. 
and the Union Haddiema Maghqudin, have a strong base within 
the public service. Indeed the latter grew out of a union which 
represented government clerical staff. There are also a number of 
specialist unions representing particular categories of staff, teachers, 
doctors, nurses, architects and so on. There is no statutory 
requirement for the involvement of unions in human resource 
management. Over the years, however, they have taken on a broad 
role in staff classification, the definition of career paths and the 
application of selection mechanisms within the public service. 
The role of each of these two sets of players is outlined below. 
The Public Service Commission 
The Public Service Commission (PSC) seeks to insulate staffing 
and discipline from untoward influences, particularly party political 
influences. Similar bodies are found in many other Commonwealth 
countries (Polidano & Manning, 1996; Wessels, 1998). In Malta 
as elsewhere, the Commission's role reflects the deep-rootedness 
of the principle that the public service should not become part of 
a political spoils system. 
Of course, the practice of impartiality in public service staffing is 
not always as deeply rooted as the principle. Public services in several 
countries have succumbed to politicisation in varying degrees, 
notwithstanding the existence of instirutional mechanisms 
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designed to prevent this happening. This can be observed in cases 
such as] amaica (Harrigan, 1995), Sri Lanka (Hulme & Sanderatne, 
1995), Trinidad and Tobago (Brown, 1999) and much of sub-
Saharan Africa (Adamolekun, 2002). Recruitment on merit can 
become a particularly sensitive, and politically contested, matter 
in ethnically divided countries (Brown, 1999). Yet, far from being 
discredited, the concept of an independent watchdog to defend 
the merit principle continues to find strong adherence even in 
countries with direct experience of administrative politicisation. 
McCourt (2001:336-340) has found this to be the case in countries 
as diverse as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Tanzania. 
In Malta, as in several other countries, the term 'watchdog' is 
actually a misnomer. It suggests that the PSC's role is to monitor 
events from a distance with a view to intervening when something 
amiss occurs. According to the Constitution, however, most 
vacancies in the public service are filled by the Prime Minister on 
the recommendation of the PSC: that is to say the Commission is 
effectively responsible for staff selection. The Constitution allows 
for staffing powers to be delegated to lower levels within the 
administration, but delegation itself can only take place on the 
Commission's recommendation. 
What does this mean in everyday administrative terms? The 
Commission is a small body which does not directly carry out 
selection exercises. Instead it seeks to ensure the integrity of the 
selection process by compelling departments to pass through a 
series of procedural checkpoints. Thus: 
A department wishing to fill a vacancy must first submit a 
draft call for applications, be it external (open to the public) or 
internal (open to serving public officers), for the Commission's 
approval prior to issuing the call. 
The department must also propose selection criteria for the 
Commission's approval. The Commission tends to vet these 
criteria with reference to past calls for applications for similar 
positions. 
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The department must then obtain clearance from the 
Commission to set up a selection board. The PSC does not 
normally allow staff from the minister's private secretariat to 
sit on selection boards, and it also requires that at least one 
member of the board be from outside the ministry concerned. 
In addition, a board member must be replaced if he or she has 
any close relations among the candidates. 
Once established, the selection board screens applications and 
interviews candidates on the basis of the approved criteria. When 
the board has finished its work it forwards a report to the 
Commission, which reviews it and finally gives the department 
the green light to engage the selected applicants. 
This is a system of centralised control based on power of prior 
approval (Polidano, 1998), with all the usual disadvantages. 
Leaving aside the repeated to-ing and fro-ing between departments 
and the Public Service Commission, the system robs departments 
of the flexibility to modify selection criteria to reflect changing 
requirements or to experiment with new selection techniques. More 
insidiously, the requirement to gain PSC approval at every stage 
of the selection process effectively transfers responsibility for the 
quality and integrity of the process from the head of department 
and the selection board to the Commission itself. Once the 
Commission has approved the selection results, the department is 
in the clear. A good system of monitoring and control should surely 
aim to emphasise departments' responsibility for selection decisions 
rather than absolve them of it. 
The current system is also less than ideal from the Commission's 
own point of view. First of all, any contestation of a selection result 
by an unsuccessful candidate would place the PSC in a conflict of 
interest since it would have to revisit and pass judgement on a 
process which it has already approved at every stage. Furthermore, 
the Commission's attention is dissipated in dealing with each and 
every call for applications in the public service when it would be 
more effective to concentrate on any specific areas of concern. 
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It is for these reasons that, as we will see later, the government 
and the Commission have been discussing proposals to delegate 
staffing powers to heads of department. 
The role of trade unions 
Staff unions negotiate with the government on two related but 
distinct issues in connection with public service employees. The 
first concerns a collective agreement which covers the public service 
as a whole. The practice of drawing up such agreements is relatively 
recent: the first was signed in December 1990. This agreement 
provided for the reform of the public service salary structure and 
it also committed the government to reviewing salaries every five 
years. In keeping with this commitment a second agreement, 
covering the years 1996-2001, was signed in 1998 providing for 
a reopening of the vertical relativities between different salary scales 
and the introduction of measures to bring about greater flexibility 
in working practices. It was also agreed that future collective 
agreements would run for three-year periods (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2002). A new collective agreement covering the years 
2002-04 was signed in December 2002. 
In addition to this there are around 60 classification agreements, 
or mini-collective agreements, regulating specific career streams 
within the public service. Each classification agreement defines 
the grades within a career stream, ties individual grades to 
particular salary scales, determines which grades are open to 
external recruitment and which are promotion grades, and sets 
out eligibility requirements for entry to each grade. In short these 
agreements effectively determine how employees are recruited and 
promoted, into what jobs, and with what qualifications. Unions 
are thus extensively involved in the management of the staff 
classification structure of the public service. The unavoidable side 
effect is to limit the service's ability to address requirements for 
new skills or to adjust terms and conditions of service in response 
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to recruitment shortfalls in particular areas. 
Matters are further complicated by the very size and diversity of 
the service, which means that the classification structure 
incorporates a wide diversity of occupational groups. This 
encourages each group to compare its terms and conditions of 
employment against those of other groups and to demand that 
any perceived imbalance in its disfavour be remedied. For example, 
if the government were to react to recruitment shortfalls in one 
particular career stream by shifting the grades in that stream to 
higher salary scales, another group which traditionally had parity 
with that stream might demand similar benefits for itself. 
Conceding the demands of this group would then prompt others 
to make claims of their own. The classification structure of the 
public service might quickly unravel under the pressure of such 
demands. 
Change is by no means impossible: on the contrary the entire 
structure was radically overhauled during the 1990s, as we will 
see later on. But that overhaul required a major effort over a five-
year period, and it represents an important achievement given the 
context we have just described. 
The impact of external actors on the choice of selection 
criteria 
External actors have influenced selection practices within the public 
service in other ways besides those described above. Throughout 
much of its history the Maltese public service has tended to rely 
extensively on selection criteria that are objectively verifiable, such 
as promotions by seniority or recruitment on the basis of written 
examinations, as opposed to 'subjective' factors such as employee 
performance appraisals (see Pirotta, 1996). This is in line with the 
traditional preferences of both unions and the Public Service 
Commission: objectively verifiable selection mechanisms protect 
employees' career prospects from over-dependence on the whims 
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of their superiors and represent the best possible insurance against 
political favouritism in public service appointments. 
It is for similar reasons that the Public Service Commission has 
not so far given sanction to the use of pre-interview short-listing. 
A private firm might set few eligibility requirements for a position, 
preferring instead to draw up a shortlist of candidates after 
scrutinising applicants' CVs. But where the public service is 
concerned this would be seen as giving excessive room for 
discretion. The practice within the service is to include detailed 
eligibility requirements (usually derived from the relevant 
classification agreement) within the call for applications and then 
to limit the role of pre-interview screening to ensuring that 
candidates meet those requirements. Subjective judgements are of 
course inevitable during the interviewing stage, bur at least the 
decisions taken here are documented through the awarding of 
marks under predetermined selection criteria. 
The inability to shortlist means that selections involving large 
numbers of applicants - for instance, the annual recruitment of 
clerks - become a lengthy exercise in which promising candidates 
can be lost because they would have found a job elsewhere by the 
time they are offered an appointment within the service. Exam-
based recruitment serves the purpose of winnowing the field of 
applicants down to a manageable number at the interview stage, 
but it is only a partial solurion since the process of marking exam 
scripts and posting results involves delays of its own. 
Another long-standing selection practice, one with well over a 
century's tradition behind it, is that of promoting staff according 
to seniority (Pirotta, 1996). Seniority was given particular weight 
in a reorganisation of the classification structure which was carried 
our in the 1970s, and which opened a promotion path all the way 
from the bottom to the top in many career streams. It meant that, 
in theory at least, a clerk could rise all the way to senior 
management level on the basis oflength of service. This suited the 
career aspirations of junior staff, but at the cost oflimiting external 
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intakes at supervisory and middle management levels and with it 
the service's ability to attract new blood. Here, however, the service 
has been largely able to overcome its historical legacy, as we shall 
see next. 
Changes since 1989 
In 1988, the government appointed a Public Service Reform 
Commission (PSRC - not to be confused with the Public Service 
Commission) to review the structure and organisation of the public 
service and make recommendations for change. In its main and 
supplementary reports (PSRC, 1989, 1990), the Reform 
Commission proposed major changes (see Warrington, 1992; 
Polidano, 1996; Pirotta 1997; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002). 
The main recommendations in respect of recruitment and selection 
were to simplify and modernise the salary and classification 
structure; to make promotions more rigorously selective on the 
basis of merit; and to give heads of department a greater say in 
recruitment and promotions through the introduction of new, 
decentralised procedures. Efforts to put these recommendations 
into effect got under way in 1990. 
The restructuring of the classification system 
In December 1990 an agreement was reached with staff unions to 
compress the salary structure, which then included over 90 different 
salary scales, into a simpler 20-scale strucrure. This new structure 
remains the basis of the staff classification and pay system in force 
today. 
Subsequently, negotiations with unions got under way in respect 
of individual career streams with a view towards making 
promotions more merit-oriented. As already mentioned earlier, 
the exercise lasted five years, eventually producing the 60 or so 
classification agreements to which we have already referred. A round 
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of minor adjustments to several of these agreements was made 
during 1998-200l. 
The classification agreements went a substantial way towards 
realising the Reform Commission's vision, although political reality 
required that they incorporated concessions for staff already in the 
service at the time the agreements were signed. Broadly speaking, 
promotions by seniority were abolished. A new regime was 
introduced in which a movement of any significant distance up 
the ladder depended on ability often as assessed through a written 
examination or on qualifications. Serving staff were granted the 
facility of 'progression' (promotion to the next higher grade after 
a number of years' service, conditional on satisfactory performance) 
in lieu of the old system of promotions by seniority, but with 
limitations as to how far up the career ladder they could go in this 
manner. 
The pattern is exemplified by the classification agreement for 
the general service, which is a career stream consisting of clerical 
and administrative grades. The particular significance of this stream 
is that its members are found in all ministries and departments; it 
represents some 10 per cent of the entire public service; and it 
supplies a large proportion of appointees to top management 
positions, including most of the permanent secretaries in post at 
the time of writing. The main agreement was signed in November 
1993 and some limited additional changes were made in an 
addendum in August 2001. 
On the one hand, the agreement allows staff who were in service 
in November 1993 to progress to a higher grade every eight years, 
up to a maximum of two grades and in any case no higher than 
Principal (a middle management grade). On the other hand, staff 
recruited subsequently have to overcome examination hurdles to 
go any significant distance up the ladder. Pre-November 1993 
staff can gain accelerated entry to the grade of Principal through 
an examination which is also open to university graduates in any 
discipline. 
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Beyond this level the new grade of Senior Principal serves as a 
stepping-stone to senior management positions. It is filled entirely 
on the basis of merit, which currently means an assessment centre 
involving a group discussion, written report and individual 
interview (the latter aiming among other things to assess 
candidates' track record). There is no progression roure to this 
grade. 
This system may seem complex and idiosyncratic in some 
respects. But its benefits should not be discounted. Indeed it 
represents an important achievement given the social and political 
context within which it was born. The seniority-based promotion 
path which ran all the way from the bottom to the top of the 
general service has been eliminated. Young graduates who join 
the public service in the grade of Pri~cipal can compete for 
promotion to Senior Principal after only two years. Those who 
succeed become immediately eligible for promotion to headship 
positions. Capable people can now rise quickly. Prior to November 
1993, the only promotion route from middle to senior management 
levels in the general service was by seniority, which meant that 
individuals had to wait for their turn regardless of their ability. 
The impact of the new system can be seen in the changing 
demographics of the public service. As a group, senior managers 
are getting younger and better qualified as vacancies in their ranks 
are filled under the new system. In 1993 just nine per cent of 
directors were under 40 years of age, yet in recent years a third of 
new appointees to directorship positions have been in their thirties 
(Grima, 2001; Naudi, 2002). 
Naturally, there remains scope for improvement. The use of a 
written exam for the recruitment of graduates at middle 
management level may seem odd; but it is necessary since under 
the terms of the November 1993 agreement, serving pre-1993 
non-graduates enter the same selection pool as graduates. More 
generally, the service continues to grapple with the historical 
preference for 'objective' selection mechanisms, which has led to 
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performance appraisal playing second fiddle to examinations as a 
selection mechanism for promotions. In the mid-1990s, however, 
a modern, objective-based system of performance appraisal was 
introduced and it has been drawn into promotion decisions. The 
system is also being linked to staff progressions since, under the 
terms of various classification agreements, progress ions are 
conditional on satisfactory performance by the employee concerned 
(see Thake, this volume). 
Performance contracts at senior management level 
Even more radical changes have taken place at the level of senior 
management. In 1992 a new top management structure was 
introduced consisting of the four levels of permanent secretary, 
director general, director and assistant director. The Constitution 
itself provided for the appointment of permanent secretaries, but 
this provision had never previously been put into effect. The new 
structure was an effort to tighten up reporting relationships within 
ministries and departments and establish more cohesive 
organisation structures, and also to introduce a greater degree of 
accountability for results. Appointments in the new top structure 
began to be made in 1992 and assistant directorshi ps were filled 
in 2000. 
It is important to appreciate that these four levels are not grades 
but simply generic position titles. A senior manager in the public 
service has two concurrent appointments: to a particular position 
for example, Director (Curriculum Development) or Director 
General (Health) and to a substantive grade which is usually pegged 
to a lower salary scale than the position. Appointments to senior 
management positions are based on a performance agreement which 
provides for the setting of annual performance targets and the 
formal assessment of the appointee's performance. Such 
appointments run for a few years at a time: permanent secretaries, 
directors general and directors are appointed for 3-year terms; 
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whereas assistant directors are appointed for 5 -year periods. 
Renewal depends on the incumbent's performance, whereas he or 
she retains tenure in his or her substantive grade. 
This system achieves a balance between the need to retain the 
concept of a career public service and the need to make senior 
public officers accountable for results. At the end of their term of 
appointment, senior managers have to compete with other 
candidates for their position. If they are not reappointed they revert 
to their substantive grade, which effectively means demotion. This 
is not a matter of theory: there have been a number of instances 
where appointments to senior management positions were not 
renewed. Malta remains one of only a limited number of countries 
worldwide which have adopted such a system of renewable 
performance contracts for senior managers throughout the public 
service (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002). 
The decentralisation of staffing 
Full decentralisation of staffing is yet to be achieved. It is fair to 
say that both the government and the Public Service Commission 
acknowledge the benefits of decentralisation, although the 
Commission is naturally concerned that any decentralised system 
should incorporate adequate safeguards for the principle of merit. 
The government and the PSC have been discussing a set of new 
draft PSC regulations which would make it possible to delegate 
staffing powers to heads of department. The Constitution requires 
that such new regulations be issued with the Prime Minister's 
approval. 
Some preliminary steps have already been taken. In 1999 
permanent secretaries were given the aurhority to engage casual 
substitute staff to cover for employees on long-term leave of absence 
on a temporary basis. In 2000 disciplinary powers were delegated 
to heads of department when new PSC regulations in this area 
were brought into effect. The arrangements by which disciplinary 
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powers were delegated to heads are innovative in that they allow 
the Public Service Commission, acting at its own discretion, to 
withdraw delegated powers from any head of department if the 
Commission finds that they are being misused. The Commission 
can also decide to take disciplinary proceedings against the head 
in question (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002). It is likely that 
any new regulations providing for the delegation of staffing powers 
to heads of department would follow a similar pattern. 
Any prospective delegation of powers raises the issue of whether 
line departments would be capable of utilising those powers 
effectively. It should be recalled, however, that even under the 
present centralised system departments play a primary role in staff 
selection. PSC selection boards are manned by public officers 
nominated for the purpose by departments: recruitment and 
promotions are only carried out centrally in respect of general 
service grades. The difference decentralisation would make to the 
selection process is in simplifying the reporting requirements 
involved and making selection boards responsible to departments 
rather than directly to the Public Service Commission. 
As in many other organisations, there is scope for putting 
personnel management in the public service on a more professional 
basis. While human resource management training has been 
organised for public officers, it is fair to say that recruitment and 
selection is not widely recognised within ministries and 
departments as an activity that requires specialist expertise. 
Nevertheless, there is an ample repository of accumulated 
experience in recruitment and selection as currently practised 
within the service. There is little doubt that ministries and 
departments would be capable of coping with decentralisation in 
this field, as they have already shown themselves capable of doing 
in respect of discipline. 
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Conclusion 
What does the evidence presented in this chapter tell us about the 
differences between government and business? On the one hand it 
is true to say that government and business draw on the same 
management toolkit, at least where recruitment and selection are 
concerned. A private-sector human resource manager would be 
familiar with all of the selection methods mentioned in this chapter. 
On the other hand, however, government is different from 
business. Some of these differences arise from the political milieu 
of government: for example, the concern that staffing in the public 
service should not be subject to political influences, which gave 
rise to the Public Service Commission as an independent guardian 
of the merit principle. Favouritism in the private sector does not 
attract anything like the same level of public concern because 
private firms are not funded by taxpayers. We have seen how the 
Commission has influenced staffing practices in the public service. 
Other differences between the public service and private firms 
are a matter of degrees rather than absolutes. Any large, heavily 
unionised organisation is likely to exhibit some of the characteristics 
reviewed in this chapter: even in the US, for example, unionised 
firms have tended to place heavy reliance on seniority for promotion 
purposes (Heneman & Heneman, 1994: 303). The public service 
is by far the largest employer in Malta; it is very highly unionised; 
and its employees are represented by not one but many unions. It 
should be no surprise if the service displays such characteristics in 
accentuated form. 
What these differences add up to is that the public service relies 
more on some of the selection tools in the management toolkit, 
such as exam-based recruitment, than on others. It cannot yet use 
particular items in the toolkit, such as shortlisting, to the same 
extent as they might be applied in the private sector. The distinctive 
characteristics of the public service do restrict the ability of its 
practitioners to apply all the tools available in the toolkit. 
The factors that make the public serVice distinctive are 
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longstanding and they will probably endure for a long time to 
come. But their impact on public service management is mediated 
through changing circumstances and situations, and it is not as 
constant or as immutable as some political scientists think it is. In 
plainer English, it is possible to bring about change in the public 
service. As we have seen, the service has been able to overcome the 
constraints of its environment; it has proven able to innovate and 
to update its management practices. Within Malta, the service is 
probably a leader in its use of performance-based accountability 
for senior managers. Beyond personnel management it is arguably 
a leader in other areas too: in the application of information 
technology, for instance, or the use of client charters (a government 
addition to the management toolkit which is only just beginning 
to be taken up by local private firms). To date, 44 charters have 
been issued under the government's Quality Service Charter 
initiative (Charter Support Unit, 2003). 
Any organisation is profoundly influenced by its environment, 
but it also has the power to shape its own destiny. 
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